Subject: SMML VOL 2956 Date: Fri, 07 Oct 2005 14:57:54 +1000 The Ship Modelling Mailing List (SMML) is proudly sponsored by SANDLE http//sandlehobbies.com For infomation on how to Post to SMML and Unsubscribe from SMML http//smmlonline.com/aboutsmml/rules.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- MODELLERS INDEX 1 DEs and Frigates 2 Revell Germany Essex class carrier 3 This is doing my head in!!! 4 Motorized RC Plastic Boats 5 FAA (Foolish Aviation Argument) 6 FAA and USN 7 a vs b 8 Re RN/USN Escorts 9 Brown deck Enterprise CVAN 65 10 FAA - development of the CAP 11 Pamir sailing Ship ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- MODELLERS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1) From "Jon Holford" Subject DEs and Frigates Good morning gentlemen. First of all, Allen, my posting on DEs versus RN escorts was intended to be contentious and to stir up trouble! My aim was and remains to learn as much as I can of the good and bad qualities of both. It seemed to me that abold sweeping statement would bring other peoples wisdom out of the closet. At the same time, what I posted was a simplification on my actual opinion - that, all with all, DEs were better than their RN opposite numbers for WW2 and immediate post war frigate duties. In my opinion, this was something of a miracle, given their confusing genesis as an American take on a British staff requirement adapted onwards to meet perceived American needs. One of the postings notes rightly the design of the Lochs around the Squid and its control systems. It was also designed for "American" (ie all welded modular) construction methods. The Castles were intended as a hort hull version of the Lochs for construction in small yards. This made the Lochs excellent one-course horses! They were nearly ideal for the Battle of the Atlantic. Not everything on the initial DE design was good. Despite the Battle of Samar, the torpedo tubes were pretty redundant for frigate duties, but they were generally replaced by more AA weapons and, post war, by AS torpedo launchers. To me the virtues of the DE design was its adaptability to meet changing technologies and operating conditions. B the timeof theRudderow/John C Butlers, the action information (CIC) setup was superior to any thing the RN had and there was the ability to adapt weapons fits to theatre requirements. For instance, the Captains in the RN had a huge depth charge capacity while the Pacific theatre DEs had powerful AA punch. The RN frigates were more specialised and therefore limited; also from the viewpoint of world-wide employment, they were far less habitable. The Black Swans are a bit of a special case. Intended as the Rolls Royces of escorts, they were the final development of a pre-war sloop (ie mini-cruiser) design. On a small displacement they tried perhaps to do too much. They were originally a pre radar design. Their radar set up showsradar offices all over the ship but no co-ordinating ops room/CIC. Reports on seakeeping are contradictory. The expansion of the USN caused a higher degree of dilution of actual sea-experience that in the RN. Some Americans referred to Flower class corvettes as "poor seaboats" with which the RN would hardly agree. This was because the Flowers, small and buoyant as corks, were very uncomfortable. They were, however, almost indestructible by weather and were excellent seaboats in that senses. I have heard the same comment applied to DEs, for the same reasons. On the other hand, the DE was generally a little less stiff (and therefore a little less stable) than the RN frigate. It was therefore less liable to rock & roll in good conditions. In extreme conditions (eg Dec 18, 1944) it might have fared less well. What do you all think, esp those with actual experience? Jon H ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2) From Subject Revell Germany Essex class carrier Has anyone heard anything more about the proposed reissue of the Revell SCB-27/SCB-125 Essex class carrier by Revell Germany? It is really going to happen? When? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3) From Mnw888@aol.com Subject This is doing my head in!!! Ladies and Gentlemen 1 The Fulmer and the Buffalo where not the greatest planes that ever took to the sky, their degree of "Rubbish" is in the eye of the beholder. 2. The Sea Hurricane and the Wildcat where not great but better than the above 3. If you wanted to fly a fighter a long way off a carrier deck in the Pacific you would pick a Hellcat 4. If you wanted to protect South East England against air attack you would pick a Spitfire I do suspect 95% of our readers thought this before this debate started and still think it. It's bad enough having to read all these statistic once but when whole sections are copied again the following day just to point out a plane could do 257mph rather that 273mph (of what ever) I begin to loose the will to live. And I do take seriously the point made today, however good or bad those planes where never forget the reasons so many young men died flying them. Now if you want an important debate we could always talk about this summers Ashes Series. Just wait till Wisden comes out next Spring than we can get a real debate on statistics going. Regards Malcolm ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4) From Kelvin Mok Subject Motorized RC Plastic Boats >> Where are you folks getting these toy boats? The only ones I've found are at Radio Shaft, er Shack, and they didn't have propellers. << This link to Sharper Image at http//skymall.com/webapp/skystore?process=prodDisplay&action=zoom&pid=69626778&iscrssl=&catId=10325 looks very much like the toy I bought from them two summers ago. Their kit contained two boats for $20 and was advertised as a store promo sale. Last Christmas I had seen kits with a single boat for $20 at one of those aisle kiosks in a shopping mall. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5) From Richard Sweeney Subject FAA (Foolish Aviation Argument) >> All of this does smell rather like the old my cars better than yours debate speaking for a number of SMMLies over here its starting to turn us off. Final note what's all this wingy thingy stuff anyway lets get back to talking about good honest ships! << Allen, on this side of the pond we call it a "Pissing Contest" and I know I'm overly tired of this one too... We haven't had an "Anglo-American" war since the "War of 1812" ended in 1815. I for one would like it to remain that way. Rich Sweeney ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6) From Ned Barnett Subject FAA and USN From "GRAHAM BOAK" >> Yes. And that is exactly what it was intended for. The Admiralty did not expect to encounter enemy single-engined fighters, and very rarely did. The Fulmar was designed to suppress enemy recce and intercept bombers. It doesn't actually matter too much if they ran away - aircraft running away can't bomb you. << That's a major difference. USN fighters were designed to defeat enemy fighters (to clear a path for our attacking aircraft), as well as to fly CAP missions over our carriers. This they did superbly. While the Fulmar may have been designed to different standards, it still had performance so poor as to limit it's success in it's chosen role - when an attacking SM-79 had a top speed of 7 mph above the Fulmar (and the Ju-88 had a 27 mph speed advantage) it must have been hard to do much to stop them. Sure, the Fulmar could net the "trash fish" - but the really deadly enemy aircraft could fly faster and higher, and that makes it VERY hard for Fulmar pilots to complete their missions. Which was my whole point, beginning to end. Remember the Blenheim - when it first went into production, it was faster than any contemporary fighters, so it was believed to be immune to interception - and because the Mosquito actually was as fast (or faster) than contemporary interceptors, it very nearly was immune to interception. With nothing more than performance parity, FAA Fulmars would have made the faster Axis attack aircraft similarly immune to interception. >> Hermes wasn't sent into combat. She was heading for a harbour and was caught unawares. << If you're in range of the enemy (as they most certainly were) you're "in combat," as any wet-behind-the-ears Midshipman ought to know (the Brits should have really known it, having lost too many carriers and other valuable ships in presumably "safe" waters already in that war). Military plans should always be based on enemy capabilities, not on presumed enemy intentions - something we fell down on at Pearl Harbor, and something the RN fell down on with the their Singapore-defense battleships (and Singapore-defense artillery - pointed out to sea, not toward land) and, apparently, with the Hermes. >> The Luftwaffe did not use the Bf 110 as a long range naval fighter, at all. << They did in Norway - the Bf-110D. >> Other than for defensive convoy patrols. It did use the Ju 88C over the Bay of Biscay but they were never available in large numbers and were not used as escort fighters against a carrier-defended fleet. They'd have died, as all twin-engined bombers did in similar circumstances. << Not if the slow-coach Fulmar was the defensive fighter - the Ju-88C could outfly and outgun the Fulmar (though by the time the C-model was in use, to be sure, the Fulmar was phasing out of service, something I should have recalled before making that observation). >> However, you are making a important miscalculation, here and elsewhere. You are talking "range" as if it was the real parameter involved. The range quoted in performance figures is one way, on a ferry. It probably does not allow for a reserve and certainly does not allow for any combat allowance. << It depends on who you cite - the figures I saw and cited were for extended flight with combat gear, not ferry range - many confuse combat radius with range, but I'm not one of those - the range figures cited by me work like this if the range of a fighter is quoted at 800 miles, you know that it can perform a combat strike out to about 225-250 miles, with time for combat, formating before the mission, circling the landing pattern, etc. The importance of the figures I cited were that they were all same-source figures, so presumably comparable. And in the Med, the RN carriers were seldom more than 200 miles from Axis territory - and as you Brits learned in the Battle of Britain, a Bf-109 could fly from Pas de Calais to London (a bit under 200 miles) and have about 25 minutes for combat. That made similar fighter-vs-fighter combat in the Med at least possible. >> The true combat radius is much lower than half the quoted figures. << Well of course - combat burns a lot of fuel. But I never claimed or suggested otherwise (nor did anyone else on this thread, AFAIK). >>Perhaps a third. And this does, of course, diminish the difference between these fighters (Zero, as always, is still outstanding.). << As long as we're comparing same-source range figures, it all evens out - I'm not sure I see your point. >> For the vast majority of its operations in the Mediterranean the RN operated outside the operating distance of contemporary fighters. Regardless of what the maps may suggest. << Well, let's agree to disagree. Between Tunis, Pantallera, Sicily and other bases on both sides of the corridor into Malta (and the corridor used for Alexandria convoys) there were plenty of opportunities for Axis fighters to fly escort missions within their range parameters. If they didn't, perhaps it was because the Fulmars were no particular threat to any strike aircraft faster than a Stuka? >> This also neglects the real operational constraint of land-based single-engined fighter pilots not being trained in over-water navigation. << That may apply to the Germans (probably did), but not to the Italians, who were much more maritime oriented (and who had a naval air force, with fighters). >> Source (for one) Boulton Paul Aircraft since 1915, by Alec Brew, published by Putnam. Immediately prewar BP moved from Norwich to a new purpose-built factory in Wolverhampton. The first aircraft they built was the Hawker Demon, under licence. BP had no production contracts for any of their own designs at this time. By the end of the Demon production, the prototype Defiants had flown, and the development was proceeding, but production was still some time away. To fill the gap BP did the detail design work for the conversion to the Roc (it was their turret, after all) and the Roc followed the Demon into production. The Defiant followed the Roc as the third type to be built at Wolverhampton. However, the production contracts did overlap, so my comment wasn't strictly correct. << Dueling sources - yours may be right (I can't verify it, as I don't have personal access to factory records), but this is what I read, published by John Dell "In all 136 Rocs were produced .The First production Roc (there were no specially built prototypes) flew on 23rd December 1938. It must have been heart-breaking for Boulton Paul to be producing the Roc when their own turret armed design, the Defiant, the prototype of which had first flown a year and a half earlier, was 100 miles per hour faster! Defiant production was underway from July 1939 and Rocs and Defiants were produced in the same factory for a year, the last Roc not being delivered until August 1940." http//freespace.virgin.net/john.dell/blackburn_roc.htm This author is also my source for the Roc as a battleship-based float plane "The Roc was designed to be fitted with a pair of floats, as used by the earlier Blackburn Shark biplane. In August 1938 , 4 months before the Roc first flew, the Director of Air Material had suggested that Roc Floatplanes be allocated to the large capital ships of the Royal Navy, with no less than 3 Rocs apiece for Malaya, Warspite, Repulse, Renown, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant and a single Roc for Rodney.** Four Rocs are known to have been modified this way (there is only photographic evidence for three). It was found that the flying qualities of the Roc with floats fitted was poor (the first one modified this way (L3059) was lost in a crash) but the fitting of a large dorsal fin under the tail improved the stability of the three other Roc floatplane modifications that are known to have followed (L3057, L3060 and L3174)." >> Yes, but that was not the position of the FAA in 1940/41/42. Jam tomorrow is no use today. << You're missing my point. At the time they were contemporary, the F4F3 and the Sea Hurricane were largely comparable in performance (with the edge to the Wildcat in terms of range) - but to say they were equivalent aircraft implies that both were at the same point in their life cycle - not true. Sea Hurricane was quickly phased out - Wildcats stayed in production and use on carriers throughout the war, and played a significant role in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in late '44, long after the Sea Hurricane was off the decks entirely. >> I think you share an understandable bias with many US enthusiasts. Crudely expressed, the war did not begin in December 1941. << Naw, you don't say? Hey, I bet you think the war started on September 3, 1939 - but that's not true, either. The war started either in 1931 in Manchuria or 1937 in China (certainly a strong case can be made for the latter date). From '37 on, the Japanese were constantly on the battlefield, and not just against China - in '40 and '41, they moved into French Indochina and related territories - and kept fighting until August 14, 1945. You may think me biased, even chauvinistic, but I think you're wrong in that. I know (and mentioned here) that the Zero was in combat from mid-1940 (just a month after the first operational Fulmar was delivered) - which suggests I know when the war started. I even noted that the first Wildcat kill was in December '40, near or over Scotland, by a few FAA Martlets. So you can think what you want, but to dismiss what I say because you incorrectly think I'm biased is just ignoring the facts. >> What could the USN have done in the Med. in 1940/41? << Not damned much, but perhaps more than you think. We had few carriers, many of the aircraft were at best "transitional" and we had yet to outfit our carriers or support ships with sufficient and effective AAA. However, if we'd been there, I presume the Buffalo would have been pressed into service as fleet defense fighter - and that (especially if, as you say, there was no fighter opposition) would have been light-years ahead of the Fulmar - better range, harder-hitting weapons, 75 mph faster, and in the version available in '40, far more maneuverable (see what the Finns did with the early-model Buffalos). >> I'm sure you don't consider it so bluntly, but the UK's relevant equipment decisions were not made in 1939/40 but in 1937 and earlier. << Which is no different than it was for the US. Our basic war-winning carrier design (the Yorktown Class, which was later updated to the largely similar Essex Class) began operation in the mid-30s (I think Enterprise was launched in '36 - the last of the Yorktowns - Hornet - was commissioned in '41). Our aircraft decisions were made beginning at that time - the TBD was operational from '37, the Wildcat was in development from '36 or '37 (and the Buffalo was in operation well before the Fulmar). >> The UK was not free to follow an uninterrupted development of its technology but had to drop everything in 1940 in favour of mass production of what it had, in the face of imminent invasion. << Something that changed quickly after October '40 - that was a 3-month or so hiatus, not a change in war status. Otherwise, how would you have had the Lancaster, the Mosquito, the Typhoon or any of the other post-1940 war-winning fighters? >> Yes, the Wildcat ended up better than the Hurricane - it would have been totally astonishing if it had not, given its later gestation. But in 1941/42 it wasn't. << You're kidding me, right? You don't think the extra firepower or extra range made a difference (let alone the more robust construction - designed for rough carrier duty)? And you call me "biased" ... whew. >> By the standards of contemporary land-based fighters (Fw190, Typhoon) it was fairly insipid. << They were hardly "contemporary" with the Wildcat - they were at least a generation later in design and operational philosophy - especially the Typhoon (credit where credit's due, the 190 was probably the best fighter in the world when it was introduced - everything, even the latest-model Spitfire, paled by comparison). However, by the time the Typhoon was in service, the Wildcat was being superceded by the Corsair and the Hellcat on front-line carriers (it was relegated to Jeep carriers by this time, where it served admirably through the end of the war) - both of which proved they could hold their own (in the US joint service fighter trials of 1944, which your Winkle Brown has written of so movingly, as has Corky Meyer, a great American test pilot in the Winkle Brown mold). Comparing the Wildcat with either the FW-190 or the Typhoon is going to show it up poorly (except in terms of range), of course - but they were hardly design contemporaries. Just as the Wildcat out-lasted the Sea Hurricane (they were of the same generation), the Wildcat shows best against it's own contemporaries, not against later generation fighters. You might as well compare the Typhoon and 190 to the Me-262 or 163 (from a performance basis) - it makes no sense. But stacked against the Corsair and Hellcat, and you've got a decent "shoot-out". >> The Hurricane was already obsolescent - though it too was still fighting on at the end of the war. What was the Wildcat's excuse? << The Wildcat has no excuse and needs no excuse. It was operating off Jeep carriers on the front line in August '45 against the Japanese - it's last major battle (one where it played a significant role) was off Leyte Gulf in October, 44 - by which time the Hurricane was on it's last operational combat legs in the Burma backwater. I frankly don't understand your seeming hostility - it's like I gored one of your prized oxen. I don't get it ... From "Erhardtsen" >> You mean like CV-1 USS Langley? << The Langley was converted away from being a carrier in '37 - by the time she was sunk in the Indian Ocean in '42, she was an aircraft transport (not even a seaplane tender) - she had a truncated deck with no launch/landing capabilities, and when she was sunk, her decks were festooned with not-yet-operational P-40 fighters, unarmed, unfueled and unflyable. Hardly the same thing as the Hermes, which was still a fully operational carrier. >> Only the Americans would load a carrier with planes, and send it into battle without the front half of the flight deck. << It was not, by that time, a carrier. It was an airport transport vessel, and it was sunk while doing the job it had been rebuilt for (originally the ship had been a collier - then it was rebuilt as an experimental aircraft carrier, then it was rebuilt as a seaplane tender, and was ultimately revised for use as an aircraft transport). What it had been in the distant past had no relevance to what it was when it was sunk. The Hermes, however, was sunk AS an aircraft carrier, operating in enemy-threatened waters but without any aircraft onboard. The only remote parallel is the Doolittle raid of April, '42 - the Hornet was so deck-loaded with B-25s that it could not conduct combat operations (so it was as helpless as the Hermes); however, it wasn't sent alone into hostile waters - it was accompanied by the Enterprise and a whole task force of ships with then-heavy AAA batteries, all to protect the temporarily helpless Hornet. And, as soon as the Doolittle bombers were launched, the Hornet (which had it's Air Group on the hangar deck) was back in business. >> No, to be serious. To me, it is only a carrier battle if the carriers fight like carriers. Hermes was a very one sided affair. You can´t use that in a debate about British fighters. << No, I used that as an aside about some of the "odd" decisions the RN made - like thinking the Fulmar was a fighter, or thinking that it made sense to strip the air group off a carrier while it was in enemy-threatened waters. >> No one could expect a Japanese task force outside of the Pacific in 1942. << Surely you jest. By early '42, the Japanese had made it abundantly clear that they could be ANYWHERE. Nobody expected them to hit Pearl Harbor - but once they did, we began fortifying the West Coast, in case they decided to head another 2500 miles east. They were already investing Singapore and pummeling Java and even Darwin Australia - with Carrier aircraft - so why couldn't they slip through the Malay Barrier and do what they did? As noted above, prudent military officer plans for the enemy's capabilities, not presumed intent - and it was clear by no later than December 31, 1941, that the Japanese carriers could be anywhere on the eastern seas. >> The use of Hermes to deliver planes in that situation was just (I am not sure, she carried fighters anyway) << It was "just" stupid, if I may say so. But at that time, lots of navy folks (on my team as well as yours) were making stupid decisions. Pye's decision to abort the Wake rescue mission is classic stupidity, as was the decision to sacrifice the ABDA fleet in a hopeless attempt to protect the indefensible Java. Hermes was just one more "stupid" decision made in the heat of overwhelming, unexpected disaster. >> Don´t retire the Claud before the Zero is coming. I am surprised, that you try to put up the speed of Cloud, at the same time as you prefer the lowest speed seen for the Fulmar. << Same source data - I cited my source for the figures - they were all from World War II Combat Aircraft by Enzo Angelucci (and others) - and I used that because somebody had already quoted Angelucci as a legitimate source in this debate. I figured using a single source for all performance figures would level the playing field - so the comparison between Claude and Fulmar is same-source, and in that comparison, the Claude had a significant speed advantage (and range advantage) - the Fulmar, however, had a much better combat battery than the under-armed Claude. >> The best speed I can find fore the Claud is 273 mph, and that is fore the A5M4 with a 710 hp. Nakajima Kotobuki engine. With 610 hp it goes 265 mph. and 252 mph with 580 hp engine. The best speed fore the A5M Claude is the same as the speed fore the Fulmar. (And by the way, if I am to tease you a little, the Wildcat that lost the competition to the Buffalo had a top speed of 288 mph. - only marginally better than the Fulmar and Claud) << But that Wildcat was not put into production - it was an early, under-powered prototype that deserved to lose (hell, the original "Wildcat" was a biplane, for God's sake) - I'm comparing the production Wildcat with the production Fulmar, and based on who you cite, the Wildcat had from 50 to 80 mph speed advantage over the Fulmar. >> The concept fore the Ju 88 was the same as earlier the B. Blenheim and later the D. H. Mosquito. A fast bomber. It was constructed to outrun the fighters, and it is not surprisingly, that it often did. << Ah, we agree (I made the same point above, before seeing your post here). But it just highlights the failure of the Fulmar, since the Ju-88 could not outrun any other contemporary fighter - not the Hurricane, not the Spitfire, not the Defiant, not the Wildcat (or even the Buffalo). >> Of course I can compare brand new types with obsolete aircrafts. << Sure, and you can compare housecats with civet cats, but the comparison makes no sense. Why not compare a late-war F4U-4 (or better yet, the FG-2) Corsair with a pre-production F4F-3? Or a Mosquito with a Bristol Fighter (hey, they were both two-seated aircraft made of wood, eh?). >> Remember, this is not a discussion of which aircraft is best. This discussion was about whether the Fleet Air Arm had been starved by RAF or there aircrafts was up to standard at the time. << Actually, it is both - a discussion of bad RAF/FAA decisions, and a discussion of the relative merits of two contemporary fleet defense fighters which flew side-by-side for three years (41-43) >> My argument is, that they was not leading, but they was up to standard in August 1939 and up to the middle of 1940. << Nope - forget '40 - the first Fulmar was delivered in June. '40 - and didn't flesh out a full, operational squadron till very late '40 or early '41 - that's the time we should compare. Besides, the Fulmar was not up to the performance of either the Buffalo (in service at that time) or the Claude (which was in the twilight year of it's career in '40). >> It does not matter, that the American F2F/F3F did not fight - it was the fighter in use on American carriers at the time, and they was no better than the British fighters in those days. << They were already being replaced in January '41 (about the time the Fulmar was first operational in squadron strength) by both the Buffalo and the Wildcat - there were very few F3Fs in carrier squadron service in January '41. >> At the time the Zero and Wildcat came in use (Late 1940 and early 1941) the British was left behind, but half a year later, they came back to level using there own Wildcats. << Oddly, that's the exact time when the Fulmar came into fleet use (about January, 41). Doesn't that tell you something about the Fulmar's ability vs. other contemporary fleet defense fighters? >> You most be mistaken naut. miles and st. miles. In naut. miles the range of the A6M2 was 1675. I know, that later models had a shorter range. << I may be mistaken, or remembering wrong - but as noted above, the "operational" range of a fighter was not the same as the ferry range. However, I do know that when the Zeroes from Rabaul were attacking Guadalcanal, they were flying at the very limit of their operational range (and carrying non-drop hang-from-the-wing tanks to do it), and Guadalcanal is between 700 and 750 miles from Rabaul - that's what I was referring to, since I specifically stated "operational range". But that's a quibble - we all know that the Zero had double or more the range of any contemporary carrier fighter (and even more range than contemporary land-based fighters). >> My conclusion is, that the FAA carriers was acceptable equipped at the begin of W.W.II. compare with the carriers of other nations. They was not leading before they got the Corsair. << If you mean September 1, 39, then you're comparing Sea Gladiators with Claudes (no question that in late '39, the USN had nothing to compare with the Claude on their flight decks, either). If you mean January '41, when the Fulmar began squadron service, you're dead-wrong - the Fulmar was the exact contemporary of the Zero and Wildcat (the superior-to-Fulmar Buffalo entered squadron service somewhat earlier) - and against the Zero and Wildcat, the Fulmar was ... lacking. Which has always been my point. It was way too slow, designed to an obsolete concept, and largely ineffective except against slow recon and attack aircraft. >> To see the Buffalo put to good use, you need to look to Finland. In Finland they used the early model - not the overloaded later model - and they loved it. It was there primary first line fighter until 1944. But you can´t really take them into account. They went into 50 meter before they opened fire, and they seem to have regarded 2 to 10 fore fair odds. << The latter two points are immaterial - they are operational choices rather than aircraft capabilities. But your other point is right - early Buffalos (some of which saw fleet service with the USN) were up-to-snuff in performance, equal to all contemporaries (but they were poorly built, with weak knees and no armor or self-sealing protection - OK against Russians, I guess, but not likely to work against Japanese carrier fighters). From "Christopher & Kayo Amano-Langtree" >> A very nice post with a lot of detail and information. However, to clarify one thing the Seafire was a better dogfighter than the American planes justifying the use made of it for close air defence and the Admirals comments. Furthermore American CAPs were not that effective whilst the Royal Navy ones were much better as they were based on fighter interception techniques developed in the Battle of Britain. Thus the RN was able to vector its fighters onto the target quicker and needed fewer numbers to make a kill. << You are right that in '42 the USN had something yet to learn about vectoring aircraft (it was operational policy, but our coordinators needed training - see Battle of Santa Cruz as a good example). But by '43/'44, the time when the Seafire flew on missions with Hellcats, we'd worked out the bugs in the system - our folks were at least equal to the RN (and on a carrier basis, generally more experienced). And head-to-head, the Seafire was not really more maneuverable than the Hellcat - see the US fighter competition of '44 (Brown and Meyer have both written about this extensively) - and the Hellcat showed how amazingly maneuverable it was (those huge wings were the reason why). >> The Seafire being short ranged is not surprising it was developed from a pure interceptor which was short ranged anyway but for the most part they were able to out-manoeuvre the Japanese fighters (Darwin was a freak). << Yeah, I always liked Wallace better than Darwin, too - that beard, man, was just too "Smith Brothers" for me. Yeah, Darwin was a freak. But in point of fact, the Zero could easily outmaneuver the Spitfire - the Spit was a great plane, but when it came to maneuverability, the Zero had no peer (the Hellcat was close - but with an experienced Zero pilot, even the Hellcat couldn't turn with a Zero). Sorry, but I think you're just wrong, and have never seen any expert who claimed the Spit was more maneuverable than the Zero - all seem to say the opposite. From "Allen Stevens" >> Gentlemen (and I suspect I am about to get shot to pieces on this) We seem to have a worrying amount of British (note not Brits its British) bashing going on here it may be that it is just friendly rivalry between the US and Britain but when I start reading comments like 'the Fulmar was a dog' (so was the P51 until it got a decent engine) << No, the P-51 wasn't a dog in it's operational environment (below 15,000 feet) - with the Allison, it still had great speed and great range - but it suffered at altitude. So if you want to call it a dog, note that it was a dog above it's designed operational altitude. The Fulmar, IMO, was a dog AT it's operational altitude, compared to contemporaries. >> 'US carriers superior to everyone' << That's not me - though in the Pacific, I think the extra carrying capability was a sound trade-off for armored decks, but that's a trade-off, not an inherent superiority - in the Med, I imagine the armored deck would have proved superior. >> 'US DE's better than RN escorts' (my wifes grandfather who commanded a River took huge and I mean huge exception to that) etc << I have no idea - but I thought the DE was a British-inspired design, so the point's moot. >> As for the suggestion that the Spitfire was somehow an inferior fighter do me a favour << OK, I will. Against the Zero in '43, it was inferior in range and turning ability - superior in speed, firepower and armor. My point is that Brit (or British - is "Brit" an insult? I do not mean it as such, and use it the way you folks seem to use "Yank," even when describing Americans from the South) pilots sent to Darwin tried to dogfight Zeroes, and were handed their lunch. Later, they learned (as we'd already learned - also the hard way) to use the vertical plane, not the horizontal plane, when fighting the Zero. It's not 'better' or 'worse' but just differing capabilities. >> anyone heard of the Battle of Britain ? If it had been Japanese planes over Dover they would have met with the same fate as the Luftwaffe. << I don't think so - here's why. Even the planes of '40 used by Japan had much longer ranges than German (or British) aircraft - they could have made Dowding try to defend the entire British Isles, rather than just Southeast England. Plane for plane, the British aircraft were largely better in '40 (faster, more heavily armed), but they couldn't turn with the Claude or the Nate. If the Japanese were in France in '40, with planes in the same number as the Luftwaffe, it would have been a very different fight, over a much broader area - but I suspect in spite of the differences that Britain would have ultimately prevailed, although it's interesting (after all, the Germans seemed afraid of a seaborne invasion - clearly the Japanese were not). A fascinating "what if" Ned Barnett ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7) From Subject a vs b Ive followed with interest the various posts re whether British or US carriers/escorts/aircraft were best,and how some Axis designs were superior,at the end of the day we should bear this in mind WE WON. Rule Britannia. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8) From Matt Subject Re RN/USN Escorts >> 'US DE's better than RN escorts' (my wifes grandfather who commanded a River took huge and I mean huge exception to that) etc etc I start to get uncomfortable. << Which ship did he command? I am quite new to ships in general (despite growing up in Leigh-on-sea for 15 years, grew up more on Spitfires and the exploits of the RAF) , but the great thing about the Internet is the ability to learn real fast, as long as the information is accurate! Is the R class the same thing? http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Q_and_R_class_destroyer Maybe still learning, but I like practically all the destroyers as they have such a sleek menacing look. >> Final note what's all this wingy thingy stuff anyway lets get back to talking about good honest ships! << Yes, before someone says that the film/movie U-571 was historically accurate and decent! Matt ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9) From "Stephen Allen" Subject Brown deck Enterprise CVAN 65 For those of you who have been interested in the on again off again debate that has been had about whether the USS Enterprise CVAN 65 had a brown/tan coloured flight deck when first commissioned, take a trip over to the Steelnavy message board to see the excellent series of color photos posted by Michael, VA of Enterprise heading out from NNS. These are NOT the National Geographic photos, but a separate series from NNS sources. Michael may also be able to eventually track down a colour match as well. I look forward to an excellent re-run of the many inventive suggestions made before for explaining away this colour as mass delusion/ freak of colour developing/impossible because we know better. regards Steve ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10) From potter4@att.net Subject FAA - development of the CAP Fighter direction was an early application of radar and strongly influenced the evolution of radar. Early naval radar sets could detect aircraft at medium altitudes. Off Norway in 1940 HMS Ark Royal, which never mounted radar, received ranges and bearings of enemy aircraft signaled from the RN’s first radar-equipped ship, HMS Sheffield. Ark Royal telegraphed contact data in short coded messages to her aircraft. With the tactical advantages of maneuver and surprise, even Skua dive bombers repeatedly drove off or shot down enemy aircraft. In June 1940 Sheffield and Ark Royal joined Force H, the new naval striking force in the western Mediterranean, under Vice-Admiral James Somerville, RN, who knew radar well. Ark Royal passed the new method to the aircraft carrier Illustrious when the latter entered the Mediterranean at Gibraltar in August 1940. The radar-equipped Illustrious tracked both friendly and enemy aircraft. The key to fighter direction was to keep a separate track chart of radar contacts. From this plot, fighter direction officers (FDOs) predicted the courses and speeds (vectors) for airborne fighters to intercept intruders. The carrier then telegraphed the vectors by short codes to the fighters. Illustrious’s Fulmar fighters shot down ten enemy aircraft in seven weeks. Greatly impressed, the U.S. Navy dropped its prevailing doctrine whereby the senior pilot aloft should direct fighter operations. During 1941 the USN adopted instead the British method of controlling fighter combat air patrols from fighter-direction posts aboard radar-equipped aircraft carriers, except that the USN used voice radio instead of telegraphy to direct the fighters. The first cadre of USN FDOs trained at the RCAF radar school. USS Lexington (CV 2) and Enterprise (CV 6) first used fighter direction successfully in February 1942 during the Marshalls raid. The long wavelengths (metric band) of early RN search radar sets created a fat, imprecise beam, reportedly 40 degrees wide. This beam revealed little information about contacts, such as their numbers, and hid low-flying aircraft altogether. RN fighter directors perforce adapted to gunnery-oriented radar sets. Britain shared to the USA its invention of the cavity magnetron, a device that generated strong radar signals at short wavelengths for precision in gunnery. The USN had time to field precise, long-range radar sets in new ships. In 1944 with an eye to the Far East the RN began to modify new ASW frigates instead for air defense of convoys. Products included the ‘Bay’ class of anti-aircraft frigates and the conversions for fighter direction of US-built ‘Colony’-class and ‘Captain’-class frigates, which mounted capable USN air-search and surface-search radar sets. Of these only HMS Caicos of the ‘Colony’ class was converted before war’s end. A height-finding radar (Type 277), an aircraft radio direction-finder, and a plotting room were installed for her new AD mission. Assigned to the 16th Destroyer Flotilla, during 1944­45 Caicos operated along a swept channel from Britain’s east coast to recaptured ports in France and Belgium. Her missions were both to guard the sea lane and to detect V-1 cruise missiles launched at Britain by air or from the Netherlands. Embarked RAF FDOs supported RAF Mosquito radar-equipped night fighters. An escort of 4­6 MTBs screened her against the primary threats of E-boats, mines, and midget submarines. A fighter direction escort was an enhanced radar picket ship. From 1943 the USN stationed destroyers at remote radar-picket sectors around aircraft carrier task groups to detect enemy aircraft below the aircraft carriers’ own radar horizon. The USN exported the aircraft carriers’ fighter direction function to the destroyers. FDOs with aircraft voice radios embarked aboard the destroyers to control a combat air patrol (CAP) of fighters for local air defense at the remote radar picket stations. These destroyers formed the vanguard that marauding enemy aircraft first saw and often attacked, notably at Okinawa in 1945, where at high cost these destroyers guarded the island itself. The cruiser HMS Argonaut, which had the most suitable radars, patrolled similarly as a radar picket 30 miles ahead of the British aircraft carrier group at Okinawa. Seafire fighters flew a local CAP over Argonaut, indicating that she had a fighter direction function. Sources Boslaugh, David L. When Computers Went to Sea (Los Alamitos, Calif. IEEE Computer Society, 1999), 16­52. Howse, Derek. Radar at Sea (London Macmillan, 1993), 35­38, 56­57, 61­62. Potter, E. B. (No relation.) Bull Halsey (Annapolis, MD USNI, 1985), 147. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11) From "Graeme Martin" Subject Pamir sailing Ship Hi All. I am trying to find a large plastic kit of the Pamir Sailing Ship that might be still on the market. Heller or Revell put out a plastic kit of Pamir in about 1150 scale a few years back. Want to know whether it is still on the market? Even an old kit that is not used or unopened box. Will buy if in good condition. cheers, Graeme Martin www.shipmodels.co.nz ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Check out the SMML site for the List Rules, Reviews, Articles, Backissues, Member's models & Reference Pictures at http//smmlonline.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- End of Volume